Recent research shows that shared access to belowground resources drives plants to 2 overproliferate fine roots competitively, limiting community-level aboveground biomass. Models 3 of this phenomenon are commonly based on an assumption that belowground resources and 4 fine roots are thoroughly well mixed. In reality, of course, fine roots are spatially structured by 5 individual. Here we investigate how costs of sending roots through horizontal space influence 6 incentives for fine-root overproliferation. We find that these costs restrain overproliferation to 7 the net benefit of community aboveground biomass. And further, the costs eliminate incentives 8 for individuals to grow fine roots beyond their closest neighbors. Plants that interact with the 9 fewest competitors benefit the most in relative fitness from overproliferation of fine roots. 10 Effectively, individual-based optimization of root allocation in space increases the effects of 11 competition while decreasing the number of individual competitors for each individual.
Introduction
lists the variables and parameters used throughout the paper. 82 Model 1, "n -competitor model" 83 In this first model, the number of individuals with the potential to share resources is taken to be 84 a constant, n (ind). Assume each individual (distinguished by subscript, k) takes up the same 85 amount of space (a, 10 cm x 10 cm or 1 dm 2 ) and each unit of space has the same environmental 86 inputs (light, water, and nitrogen). That is, given specific plant traits, changing n does not 87 change an individuals' resource availability. 88 For simplicity, also assume the plants are annuals. Plants fix carbon through photosynthesis 89 (A k , gC yr −1 ) and that carbon is used to pay for the building and maintenance costs of plant 90 tissues: leaves (l k , gC), fine roots (r k , gC), and reproduction ( f k , ind yr −1 ).
91
A k = c l l k + (c r + c x x k ) r k + c f f k ,
(1) . Each hexagon represents one individual's "home space" and each individual's roots are represented by lines matching the color of their home space. Model 1: Each individual has the same amount of space and resources and is equally connected to every other individual. Across the first three panels, we see the effect of changing n if all individuals have the same strategy of fine root investment (r) and placement (x, the proportion sent to compete with neighbors). The final panel shows the general case of n individuals, each with their own strategy (r k and x k ). Model 2: A portion of the 96 individual hexagonal torus is depicted. Individual density (n d ) increases across the first three panels. As belowground home space decreases with density so too does the cost of sending roots toward neighbor a set number of neighbors (6, 12, or 18 ; c x (# rings), eq. 8). The final panel depicts fine roots belowground for a case in which a target individual (purple) is competing with its 6 closest neighbors (green). As belowground competition is the focus of this theoretical investigation, in all cases leaf area per individual is constant.
The rate of photosynthesis for an individual (A k ) may be limited by light, water, and/or nitrogen. For efficiency, in the main text, we describe only the case of constant water limitation. 
122
For water-limited plants, photosynthetic rate it proportional to water uptake (w, L yr −1 ):
where ω is the water use efficiency (gC L −1 ). The uptake of water by individual k (w k ) depends 124 on the available water at both home (S k , L) and away sites (S j , where j = k):
Where (1 − x k ) is the proportion of the individual's r k fine roots that stay at home and u S is the 126 uptake efficiency of fine-root biomass for water (gC −1 yr −1 ).
127
Water available at a site is the balance of incoming rainfall, R (dm yr −1 ), first-order 128 soil-moisture dependent losses from the rooting zone (∆, yr −1 ), and uptake by all plants with 129 fine roots at the site (r T,k , eq. A1):
A L is the photosynthetic rate for a plant canopy given light level and leaf biomass (eq A4).
the individual's allocation to reproduction:
Because we assume mortality rate to be independent of the plant strategies of investigation, this 142 allocation to reproduction is treated as a measure of individual fitness.
143
Model 2, "hex-grid competition model"
144
Here we will expand on Model 1 by adding an explicit treatment of space and include a 145 feedback between allocation to reproduction and the density of individuals (n d , ind dm −2 ). We 146 maintain the assumption that, given population density, all individuals occupy equal amounts 147 of space (a = 1 n d , figure 1 ). We use a population size of 96 individuals and arrange individuals 148 on a hexagonal grid whose spatial scale changes with density. The grid is wrapped on a torus to 149 avoid edge effects.
150
Individual density in this model is the result of the reproduction ( f k ) and the mortality (µ, 151 yr −1 ) of individuals in the site:
The resulting density can be found by solving the above at equilibrium. If all individuals in the 153 site have the same strategies reproduction will simply balance mortality:
wheren d is the equilibrium individual density of the site.
155
As density changes, the distance between individuals changes and thus the cost of sending 156 roots to another individuals' home space should change. We assume the cost of roots sent away increases with the square of the distance over which plants send their roots:
where c x,0 is a constant property of the soil and plants (gC gC −1 dm −1 yr −1 ), "# rings" is the 159 number of concentric rings of hexagons across which an individual spreads its x k * r k roots. With the frameworks for both the "n-competitor" (Model 1) and the "hex-grid competition" 174 (Model 2) models, we search for belowground plant strategies that will dominate at 175 equilibrium. These strategies may be achieved through individual plasticity, community 176 assembly, or adaptive trait evolution. We consider fine roots (r), the proportion of fine roots 177 plants send away (x), and the number of rings of competitors they send their roots to (Model 2 178 only) as traits. Leaf biomass l is also taken to be value that optimizes fitness. site (resident), cannot be invaded by other strategies and are achievable through mutations of 182 small effect (ESS and CSS, Geritz et al. 1998 ).
183
Many analyses like this are based on models with an infinite number of individuals and it 184 can be assumed that the mutant has a negligible effect on the residents' environment. That is 185 not the case here. We assume one individual has the mutant strategy and the rest of the 186 individuals have the resident strategy. For example, in the first model, this gives us the 187 following fitness functions for the resident (R) and mutant (M) strategy types, respectively:
and
The competitive dominant, the evolutionarily stable strategy, if one exists, is the strategy that 
Because the influence of the strategy of the mutant on the environment is significant here, 
Results

207
We begin with results from Model 1, the "n-competitor model" designed to investigate the role 208 of the number of competitors on incentives for competition belowground. The following exact predictions for a mean field case match numerical results for the case of 216 c x = 0 (figure 2, gray lines versus dots):
This strategy results in a "full" tragedy of the commons, the ESS strategies in monoculture have 218 no allocation to reproduction as in Zea-Cabrera et al. (2006b) .
219
If the cost of competition, c x , however is positive we find qualitatively different results. The fraction of potential reproductive output diverted to competitive overinvestments, here fine roots. Results shown are for cases of zero (gray) and non-zero (black) costs of extending roots to neighbors' home space (c x ). Lines show the predictions for an even distribution of fine roots (A) and well-mixed or mean-field water availability (B-D, eq. 12). If not otherwise indicated, parameter values are those found in Table 1. proportional allocation belowground to competition (x ESS ) increases.
Both increasing the extrinsic cost of root extension through space (c x,0 ) and rate of first-order , send them to their closest ring of neighbors (6 competitors), or send them to the closest two rings of neighbors (18 competitors). All individuals in the 96 individual grid have the resident strategy except for one mutant. (+) marks cases in which the mutant strategy performs better than the average resident ( f M >f R ), (-) marks cases in which the average resident performs better than the mutant ( f M <f R ) and (0) indicates neutrality ( f M =f R ). Here, we see the strategy of competing with only closest neighbors (6) is the competitive dominant (ESS). It cannot be invaded by any other strategy when resident. This result was found for a broad range of environmental conditions (including all cases where c x > 0 and x ESS = 0, see main text for further detail). Figure 4 : The effects of belowground competition across environmental gradients: (A) R rainfall, (B) N nitrogen-mineralization rate, (C) c x,0 , the cost of extending roots through space (eq 8), and (D) ∆ the first-order leakage loss rates of water and nitrogen from the soil. Each panel shows results for fine-root biomass (r ESS , gC ind −1 ) on the left axis and proportion of fine roots sent to compete with neighbors (x ESS ) and resulting individual density (ind dm −2 ) on the right axis. The proportion of time spent with enough water to not be water limited is q, a parameter set to 0, 1, 0.5, and 0.5 in A through D, respectively. Values of all other parameters can be found in Table 1 . Only if there are no costs to competition -specifically, no costs of extending roots closer to 299 competitors than oneself -do we find that plant communities satisfy the assumptions of a mean 300 field approximation. In this extreme case, individuals invest in so many fine roots for individual 301 gain that at ecological and evolutionary equilibrium the community has no carbon left to invest 302 in reproduction, the "paradox" of the tragedy of the commons (Zea-Cabrera et al. 2006b ). We 303 have found before that this paradox is resolved if one considers a realistic amount of variability find that incentives for competitive overinvestments are strongest when individuals are strategy to keep all roots at home (figures C2 and C3).
It is interesting to note that unlike the restraint from competition caused by a cost of 361 extending roots through space (c x ), the restraint from competition caused by an increase in 362 optimal allocation of roots for foraging (high leakage, ∆) comes without benefits to the rest of 363 the plant (figure 4, C5) . This mechanism of restrained competition is not a restraint from the 364 tragedy of the commons, but rather, a harsh environment overall. In order to focus the investigation here, we have ignored many of the fascinating aspects of feedbacks. Initial analyses of the inclusion of these listed phenomena have not changed these 395 basic qualitative insights. But I look forward to investigating their interactions in more detail.
396
Such work is likely to produce intriguing and useful refinements to this understanding.
397
Conclusion
398
Through building and analyzing strategically simple models, we develop new hypotheses of the 399 importance and nature of belowground competition across environmental resource gradients. 400 We find that the physical fact of a cost of growing roots horizontally through space can restrain 401 over-proliferation of fine roots with a net benefit on aboveground biomass. Only if plants are in 402 environments where foraging for resources belowground is so tough that competition does not 403 matter, or they face physical barriers to interactions with one another, are there incentives for 404 individuals to disengage from competition belowground entirely.
405
In almost all cases, we find individuals have incentives to compete with their closest and 406 only their closest neighbors. This leads to the highest payoffs of overproliferation of fine roots 407 and thus maximizes the effects of competition while minimizing the number of competitive 408 interactions among individuals.
409
These insights help explain the ubiquity of the importance of competition across 410 environmental gradients and give specific predictions for the optimal level and extent of 411 belowground fine root extension. They also show the importance of considerations of the cost of 412 growing roots through space for quantitative predictions of allocation strategies and thus 413 ecosystem carbon storage (Foley et al. (1996) ).
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